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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-PERSONAL ToRT LIABILITYEFFECT OF STATUTES AUTHORIZING CONTINUANCE OF DECEDENT'S
BusINEss-It is an accepted doctrine wherever the question has arisen
that executors and administrators are liable for their torts individually
rather than in a representative capacity, and that judgments against
them, recovered in tort actions, are collectible out of the private property of the representative and not out of estate assets.1 The same rules
are applied in cases involving tru~tees. z Conceding the correctness of
this general doctrine, the question may be raised whether statutes which
permit the court to authorize a personal representative to continue the
operation of a decedent's business should be construed so as to change
the common law rule and relieve executors and administrators of personal liability for torts. This question was considered in the recent
California case of Johnston v. Long.8 Plaintiff sustained personal in88 See BLOSE and CAILVER, STATISTICS OF THE EDUCATION OF NEGROES 6, Table
8 (1944). For further material, see 56 YALE L. J. 1059 at 1062 (1947), and 14
J. OF NEGRO EDUCATION 509 et seq. (1945); IS id. 263 et seq. (1946); 16 id.
1 Fredenburg v. Hom, 108 Ore. 672, 218 P. 939 (1923) (conversion); Digby
v. Cook, 200 Ark. 1004, 142 S.W. (2d) :z.:z.8 (1940) (defective condition of
premises); Christensen v. Frankland, 324 Ill. App. 391, 58 N.E. (2d) 289 (1944)
(trespass and assault); Boyle v. Nolan, 123 N.J.L. 365, 8 A. (2d) 358 (1939)
(negligence in making repairs); Bannigan v. Woodbury, 158 Mich. 206, 122 N.W.
531 (1909) (servant of executrix negligent in operating logging road); McCue v.
Finck, 20 Misc. 506, 46 N.Y.S. 242 (1897) (executrix's employee negligent); Kalua
v. Camarinos, II Hawaii 557 (1898) (administrator's servant negligent); ATKINSON,
WILLS,§ 223 (1937); 21 AM. JUR.. 553; 24 C.J. 128; 51 L.R.A. 261 (1901);
44 A.L.R. 637 (1926); 127 A.L.R. 687 (1940).
.
z :z. TR.UST RESTATEMENT, § 264 ( I 935) ; 3. BOGERT, TRUSTS, part 2, § 731
(1946); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, §§ ~64 and :z.67 (1939); 127 A.L.R. 687 (1940). Professor Bogert takes the position that a personal representative who carries on the
business of a decedent is a trustee, and that this is true whether or not he be given
this designation, 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS, part 1, § 572 (1946).
8 (Cal. 1947) 180 .P. (2d) (Adv. Sheet) 21, (opinion withdrawn by order of
Court), as modified on denial of rehearing 181 P. {2d) 645. Two justices dissented
to both opinions on• the ground that the jury was confused; one justice dissented,
taking the position that authorization to an executor to ·conduct a business in his
official capacity carries with it authorization to be sued in the same capacity, and that
the judgment in this case runs against the defendant solely as executor of the estate.
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juries when an overhead door fell on him as he was entering a garage.
The garage was operated by defendant executor according to the terms
of the testator's will and pursuant to the California Probate Code. The
injury was caused by the negligence of an employee. Plaintiff instituted a suit for damages against defendant in his individual capacity.
The district court of appeals found for defendant on the ground that
section 572 of the Probate Code,4 which permits the court to authorize
a personal representative to carry on the business of a decedent, makes
an executor, who is not personally at fault, liable exclusively in his
representative capacity.5 The Supreme Court of California reversed,
taking the position that an executor has always been personally liable
for any torts committed by him in administration of the estate, and that
there is nothing in section 572 of the Probate Code to indicate that a
change in the rule was intended.
This appears to be the first instance in which a personal representative has sought to invoke a statute _authorizing him to continue decedent's business as a-defense to a tort action. The conflict between the
majority on the one hand, and one dissenting justice and the District
Court of Appeals, on the other, suggests that the executor's arguments
have some merit and that the principal ·case should not be regarded
as foreclosing the issue in other jurisdictions having similar statutes.
It is the purpose here to consider the effect of statutes which provide authority for personal representatives to operate a business on the
representatives' tort liability. An important factor in deciding whether
the statutes change the common law rules relating to tort liability of
executors and administrators is the manner in which the courts regard
those rules-are they fair and do they make for good law, or are they
harsh and arbitrary? For this reason attention is first directed to the
practical operation of and reasons behind the common law doctrine.

A. The Common Law
Direct suit against the estate
In line with the basic proposition that executors, administrators
and trustees are liable for their torts individually,6 there is general
agreement that the victim of the representative's tort cannot obtain
I.

4 "After notice to all persons interested in an estate, given in such manner as
may be directed by the court or a judge thereof, the court may authorize the executor
or administrator to continue the operation of the decedent's business to such an extent
and subject to such restrictions as may seem to the court to be for the best interest
of the estate and those interested therein." Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944)
§ 572.·
.
.5 Johnston v. Long, (D.C. App. Cal. 1946) 171 P. (2d) 538.
6 ATKINsoN, W1u.s, § 223; 21 AM. JuR. 553; 24 C.J. 128; 51 L.R.A. 261
( I 90 I) ; 12 7 A.L.R. 687 ( I 940) ; and cases cited supra, note I.

1948 J

COMMENTS

recovery from the decedent's or trust estate. 7 The reasons usually
assigned for the latter holding are that in so far as the representative
commits a wrong he does not represent the estate and that the law
will not allow property of the estate to be impaired or dissipated
through the negligence or improvidence of the representative.8 In recent years, however, there has been some agitation for making the
estate primarily liable for all of the economic burdens arising out of
a business from which it derives a profit. In conformity with this idea
it has been suggested that an individual who is injured by the tort of
the representative of the estate should have a direct action against the
estate.9 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed a statutory solution in the trust cases,1° but the suggesteq. change has not
been widely accepted. The Model Probate Code does not make such a
change and later cases indicate that many jurisdictions are satisfied
with the common law rule which limits the injured party to his· action
against the personal representative.11
Reaching the ,personal representative's right to exoneration
Even though the injured party must resort to a suit against the
personal representative and does not usually have an action against
the estate, the representative does not have to stand the loss in every
case. It is well settled that when the personal representative who is
free from blame is held individually liable for the tortious act of an
agent, he is entitled to indemnity out of the estate assets.12 This prin2.

7lbid.
8 Clauson v. Stull, 331 Pa. IOI, 200 A. 593 (1938); Hundley v. Pendleton, 9
Ga. App. 268, 70 S.E. III5 (19n); Plimpton v. Richards, 59 Me. u5 {1871);
Louisville v. O'Donaghue, 57 Ky. 243, 162 S.W. II IO (1914); Parmenter v.
Barstow, 22 R.I. 245, 47 A. 365 (1900); Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.
(2d) 910 (1945).
_
9 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 271A2 (1939); Fulda and Pond, "Tort Liability of Trust
Estates," 41 CoL. L. REV. 1332 at 1353 et seq. (1941).
10 Uniform Trusts Act, §§ 13 and 14, 9 U.L.A. 719 (1942); Vanneman and
Rowley, "The Uniform Trusts Act," 13 UNiv. CIN, L. REv. 157, 171-175 (1939).
11 SIMES, MoDEL PROBATE ConE 13 8 ( l 946) (§ l 3 l on continuation of decedent's business); Skinner v. Redding, {Del. Sup. Ct. 1945) 45 A. (2d) 507;
Ostheimer v. McNutt, {Ind, App. 1946) 66 N.E. {2d) 142; Brown v. Mack, 185
Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1945); Christensen v. Frankland, 324 Ill. App.
391, 58 N.E. {2d) 289 (1944); Digby v. Cook, 200 Ark. 1004, 142 S.W. {2d) 228
(1940); Boyle v. Nolan, 123 N.J.L. 365, 8 A. {2d) 358 (1939); Kirchner v.
Muller, 280 N.Y. 23, 19 N.E. {2d) 665 (1939). Contra, Ernest G. Beaudry, Inc, v.
Freeman, 73 Ga. App. 736, 38 S.E. (2d) 40 (1946).
12 Havill v. Newton, 202 Ill. App. 15 (1916); McCue v. Finck, 20 Misc. 506.
46 N.Y.S. 242 (1897); Benett v. Wyndham, 4 DeG. F. and J. 259, 45 Eng. Rep.
u83 (1862); Matter of Lathers' Estate, 137 Misc. 226, 243 N.Y.S. 366 (1930),
annotated in 29 MICH, L. REV. 469 (1931) and 79 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 623 (1931);
1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 247 (1935); 21 AM. JuR,, Executors and Administrators,
§ 307; 44 A.L.R. 637 at 676 (1926).
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ciple is sound. The representative is not an insurer of the estate and
if his acts in the administration of the estate are proper, and he is not
individually at fault, there is no reason for not allowing him to seek
reimbursement from the estate for losses sustained. Such a holding
has led to argument that when the personal representative is not at
fault the tort creditor should be allowed to bring a direct suit against
the estate in order to avoid circuity of action. 18 This argument is usual. ly rejected. The explanation given in many of the trust cases is that
courts of law do not recognize the trustee in any other capacity than
as owner of the estate, and that the trust ·estate is not regarded as a
separate entity.14 But such reasoning carries no weight in cases involving executors and administrators. It is ev:erywhere recognized that
executors and administrators can be sued in a representative capacity
in a law court. Moreover, non-existence of the trust as a legal entity
is no longer a controlling consideration.15 The chief reason for not
allowing a tort creditor a derivative suit against the estate, without a
showing of special facts, is that such a procedure would necessitate a
trial in the same action both of the tort liability and of the question
whether the nature of the tort was such that the representative should
be entitled to reimbursement out o.f the assets of the estate. It is
further argued that the eleip.ent of representative's fault would not
be a fighting issue if he were sued in his official capacity. The plaintiff
would be attempting to prove that the representative was not personally
at fault, and it could hardly be expected that the representative would
argue strenuously that he was not liable iri. his representative capacity
but was personally at fault and should pay for the injury out of ·his
private assets.16
.
There has been some dissatisfaction with the reasoning employed
to deny tort creditors the' right to reach the personal representative's
right to exoneration. A few writers have asserted that the current
trend is toward allowing the injured party to be subrogated to whatever right the representative may have.17 The more recent cases indicate, however, that a substantial majority of the courts still adhere
to the general rule that the tort creditor may not sue the personal
representative in his representative capacity.18
18 Ewing v. Foley, n5 Tex. 222, 280 S.W. 499 (1926); 25 VA. L. REv. 235
(1938); 51 HARV. L. REV. 1455 (1938).
14 Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N.E. 604 (1923); 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS
1485 (1939).
•
·
15 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS 1528 (1939); Fulda and Pond, "Tort Liability of Trust
Estates, 41 CoL. L. REv. 1332 at 1334 (1941).
16 Kirchner v. Muller, 280 N.Y. 23, 19 N.E. (2d) 665 (1939).
17 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS, part 2, § 732 (1946); 25 YA. L. REV. 235 (1938); 51
HARV. L. REV. 1455 (1938); 44 A.L.R. 637 (1926).
18 Note I 1, supra. ·
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Although the party suffering from a tort of the personal representative's agent may not have a direct suit against the estate, without
a showing of special facts, there is good authority for such a suit when
the will provides that the esta:te should be liable,19 when the representative is insolvent or out of the jurisdiction,2° and when the tort of
the representative or his agent is committed while the representative
is acting under the control or supervision of the beneficiaries of the
business.21 If the estate is unjustly enriched by a tort of the representative the tort creditor may be able to reach estate assets even though
the representatives would not have a right to reimbursement if he
satisfied the claim. 22

3. Suit against the personal representative
With the possible exception of Georgia and Oregon, courts agree
that a personal representative is individually liable for the torts of
employees engaged in the business of the estate, and the fact that the
assets of the estate are insufficient to reimburse the representative is
no defense.28 The most difficult case, and the one in which a personal
19
Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905) (deed of trust); Birdsong
v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W. (2d) 98 (1928) (trust instrument); 3 BoGERT,
TRUSTS, part 1, § 572 (1935); 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 270 (1935). Cf. Ireland
v. Bowman & Cockrell, 130 Ky. 153, II3 S.W. 56 (1908).
20
Matter of Damsky, 175 Misc. 460, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 897 (1940); Johnson
v. Leman, 131 Ill. 609, 23 N.E. 435, (1890); Dantzler v. Mclnnis, 151 Ala. 293,
44 S. 193 (1907); Gates v. McClenahan, 124 Iowa 593, IOO N.W. 479 (1904)
( trustee residing outside the state).
21
Wright v. Caney River R.R., 151 N.C. 529, 66 S.E. 588 (1909); Ross v.
Moses, 175 S.C. 355, 179 S.E. 757 (1935).
22
This principle is no broader than the restitutionary doctrine of unjust enrichment. The estate may be held even though tort was intentional. In re Hunter,
(D.C. Pa. 1907) 151 F. 904, 44 A.L.R. 637 at 664 (1926). If the representative
acted in good faith some courts hold that he is only liable in his official capacity.
Grimes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo._421, 148 P. 256 (1914); White v. McFarland, 148
Mo. App. 338, 128 S.W. 23 (1910); Mulford's Admr. v. Mulford's Executor, 40
N.J. Eq. 163 (1885). Other courts hold the representative is not exonerated of
personal liability even though he acted in good faith. Von Schmidt v. Bourn, 50
Cal. 616 (1875); Herd v. Herd, 71 Iowa 497, 32 N.W. 469 (1887).
28
Kalua v. Camarin~s, II Hawaii 557 (1898); McCue v. Finck, 20 Misc.
506, 46 N.Y.S. 242 (1897); Campus v. McElligott, 122 Conn. 14, 187 A. 29
(1936); Fisher v. McNeely, II0 Wash. 283, 188 P. 478 (1920); Baker v. Tibbetts,
162 Mass. 468, 39 N.E. 350 (1895). But see Fetting v. Winch, 54 Ore. 600, 104
P. 722 (1909), for dictum that an executor without personal fault is not liable in
his individual capacity. if he has no interest as a distributee. Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga.
App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Ernest G. Beaudry, Inc. v. Freeman, 73 Ga. App.
736, 38 S.E. (2d) 40 at 47 (1946), " •.. under the testamentary scheme [authority
in the will to continue a garage business] the First National Bank as executor and
trustee of Ernest G. Beaudry was liable to the plaintiff for the injuries inflicted by its
tortious act in its representative and not individual capacity..•• "
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representative would have the best chance of getting a court to stray
from the beaten path, is that in which the estate is insufficient to provide
reimbursement. When faced with such a dilemma the representative
might argue that his liability to the plaintiff is limited by the amount
by which the estate can reimburse him. Such a solution is suggested in
the comparatively recent Nebraska case of Smith v. Rizzuto.24 A
trustee was sued for injuries sustained from a fall caused by ice accumulation upon the porch of an ~partment house to which the trustee
held title. The trustee was not in a managerial position at the time
the accident occurred. In a suit against the trustee in his individual
capacity the court limited recovery to the value of the trust estate. It
has been suggested by some authorities that the solution reached in
Smith v. Rizzuto might be applied in cases where a trustee or executor
is operating a business,25 but clearly the case is not authority for such
application. The Nebraska court limited its decision to a situation in
which a trustee is held liable as title holder, and even on that point
it is of questionable soundness.26
In a case in which the estate is in~u:fficient to reimburse the representative, the real problem would appear to be whether the hardship
that would be placed on the trustee or executor by holding him liable
to the full extent of the loss outweighs the hardship that would be imposed on the person seeking to enforce liability if he were allowed to
recover only to the extent of the estate assets. It is submitted that requiring the executor to pay to the full extent of the los~ is not only a
harmonious application· of legal doctrine but also sound from a policy
standpoint. The injured party .has ho warning and can do little to
protect himself from loss, whereas the personal representatives may
secure liability insurance, paying premiums out of· the assets of the
estate as a proper expense of the business.21
24 133 Neb. 655, 276 N.W. 406 (1937), noted in 18 NEB. L. BuL. 98 (1937);
51 HARv. L. REV. 1455 (1938); 23 lowA L. REV. 669 (1938); and 22 MINN. L.
REV. 907 (1938).
25 2 ScoTI', TRUSTS 1488 (1939); Fulda and Pond, "Tort Liability of Trost
Estates," 41 CoL. L. REV. 1332 at 1356 (1941).
26 The defendant, though named in the will as trustee, renounced. Ordinarily
when a trustee disclaims, not having previously accepted the trust, his disclaimer has
a retroactive effect and relieves him of any liability to the beneficiaries or to third
parties. l ScoTI", TRUSTS, § 102.3 (1939). Furthermore, even though it be assumed
that a trustee named in the will could not renounce and thereby avoid liability, the
section in the TRUSTS REsTATEMENT cited by the Nebraska Court as authority for ~ts
holding does not in fact support it. 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 265 (1935). A caveat
following this section states that "it is not intended to express any opinion on the
question" of whether a trustee is personalJy liable as a title holder beyond the value
of estate assets.
27 In re Stewart's Will, 169 Misc. 917, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 315 (1938), holding
executor is entitled to credit for premiums paid on insurance against public liability.
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B. STATUTES
It is well established that an executor or administrator has no authority to carry on the business of decedent solely by virtue of his
position. The inherent power of a court to authorize the personal
representative to continue decedent's business is so uncertain that at
least twenty states have deemed it necessary to provide such authority
by statutory enactment.28 The question is raised as to whether these
statutes have any effect upon the personal representative's liability
for torts of his agents.
In Johnson v. Long 20 the California Supreme Court took the position that the California statute granting power to the court to authorize
a personal representative to carry on the business of decedent does not
change the common law tort liabilities of executors and administrators.
Although the language of the California statute differs from the language of comparable statutes in other states, their basic features are
the same and a similar construction might well be expected.
The pertinent part of the California statute reads as follows:
" • • • The court may authorize the executor or administrator
to continue the operation of the decedent's business to such an
extent and subject to such restrictions as may seem to the court
best for the interest of the estate and those interested therein." 30
The absence of express language referring to the responsibilities
and liabilities of the executor or adminis~tor w.qo operates the business
is typical of this kind of statute. ..{llloth~r-cqiruhori feature of the continuation of business statutes is that no··meiition is made of the' !iaoility
of decedent's estate to business creditors or tort creditors. Thus, a
contention that these statutes relieve the personal representative of
Holland v. Doke, 135 Ark. 372, 205 S.W. 648 (1918); Richardson v. McCloskey,
(Tex. Comm. App. 1925) 276 S.W. 680; 33 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators,
§ 238 (b).
28
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 61, § 198; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4960; 21 Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1944) § 733.08; 31 Ga. Code (1937), tit. II3, § 1523; 3 Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946} § 366 (a); 2 Iowa Code (1946) § 635.52; Kan.
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1943) § 59-1402; 2 Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141, §§ 50, 66;
6 Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1946) c. 195, § 7; 23 Mich. Ann. Stat. (Moore, 1943)
§§ 27.3178 (287), (641) to (654); l Miss. Ann. Code (1942) § 579; 3 N.D.
Rev. Code (1943) c. 30-18, § 1816, subdiv. 5; 7 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page,
1938) § 10509-9; Ore. Laws (1943) c. 376; 20 Pa. Ann. Stat. (Purdon, 1930)
§ 807; R.I. Laws (1938) c. 575, § 33; 9 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3427;
5 Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-u-8; 3 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932)
§ 1460; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 572. For a discussion of a number
of these statutes see Adelman, "The Power to Carry on the Business of a Decedent,"
36 M1cH. L. REV. 185 (1937).
29
Note 3, supra.
so Cal. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 572.
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individual tort liability must be based on something other than express
statutory language.
The executor in Johnson 'V. Long argued that the California statute
placed him in a position similar to that of a receiver in bankruptcy and,
therefore, should be construed as relieving him of his common law
liability for the torts of his agents.si He further argued that since the
statu~e had been interpreted so as to shift contract liabilities from the
executor to the estate it should also be regarded as placing tort lia,bilities on the estate rather than the personal representative in situations
in which the representative is free from fault. 82 These arguments were
made possible by earlier opinions interpreting the statute. Prior to
Johnson v. Long the California District Court of Appeals had suggested that the statute made the estate the operator of-the decedent's
business and the executor an agent of the estate.83 That court held that
..contractual obligations entered into by an executor or administrator
properly operating a business, which under the common law rule were
chargeable to the executor or administrator, were chargeable directly
to the estate.8" ·
The California District Court of Appeals cited its earlier opinions
as authority for interpreting the statutes so as to discharge an executor
from tort liabilities in situations in which he was not at fault. 85 The
court reasoned that there is no substantial difference in theory between
a representative's personal liability for contracts executed in conducting the business of a decedent and his personal liability for torts of
business employees. The California Supreme Court summarily dis. missed this line of reasoning by stating:
•
" ... There is no doupt that contractual obligations properly
incurred are chargeable against the estate and that tort liability,
3 1. Ordinarily receivers who are themselves free from fault are not personally
liable for injuries caused by their'servants. 63 L.R.A. 227 (1904); IO A.L.R. 1055
(1921); Underhay, "Tort Claims in Receiverships and Reorganizations," 22 IowA L.
REv. 60 (1936). "Actions against ~e receiver are in_ law actions against the receivership, or the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeasances, negligences and liabilities are official and not personal .•.••" McNulta v. Lochridge, 141
U.S. 327 at 332, 12 S.Ct. II (1891).
82 Where _the personal representative, operating the business of decedent, makes
a contract with a third person the personal representative is personally liable on the
contract in the absence of a valid stipulation in the contract limiting his personal
liability. In re Thurber's Estate, 3II Ill. 2II, 142 N.E. 493 (1924); AngloAmerican Direct Tea Trading Co. v. Seward, 294 Mass. 349, 2 N.E. (2d) 448
(1936); ATKINSON, WILLS 612 (1937). 88 California Employment Stabilization Commission v. Hansen, 69 Cal. App.
(2d) 767, 160 P. (2d) 173 at 175 (1945); In re Estate of Allen, 42 Cal. App. (2d)
346, 108 P. (2d) 973 (1941); see 2 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 132 (1943).
8 " Ibid.
85 Johnston v. Long, (D.C. App. Cal. 1946) 171 P. (2d) 538.
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where the executor is not personally at fault, should ultimately
be borne by the estate." 86
The court took the position that if the statute had any effect on
the question of tort liability it could be carried out by applying the
rule of the Restatement of Trusts. This was merely another way of
saying that the statute left unchanged the common law doctrine of
executors' and administrators' tort liability.87
It is submitted that the logic employed by the California District
Court of Appeals is sound. There is no basis for construing such a
statute so as to change the common law as to the contract liabilities
of the personal representative and the decedent's estate while leaving
unaltered their liabilities for the torts of agents and employees. The
difficulty with this analysis, so far as other jurisdictions are concerned,
is that outside of California this type of statute has not been regarded
as materially altering the common law contract liabilities of the ex- ecutor or administrator. Although there are some indications that the
statutes may furnish authority for allowing a: ~ontract creditor to bring
a direct suit against the estate to obtain the representative's right to
reimbursement, most courts have not construed the statutes so as to
relieve the executor or administrator of his personal liability for contracts executed in the conduct of the business.88
It is unlikely that other courts which have construed these statutes
as leaving unchanged the positions of the executor and of the estate
in regard to contractual liability would interpret them as shifting tort
liabilities from the executor to the estate. But if the court has used the
statute as a basis for permitting a contract creditor to bring a direct
action against the estate to reach the executor's right to exoneration,
it might allow a tort creditor a similar right. On this latter point,
however, Johnson v. Long cannot be ignored. Dictum in that case
suggests that, even though the statute may be held to place contract
liability directly upon the estate, still, it provides no authority for a
tort creditor to obtain the representative's right to reimbursement by
a direct suit against tlie estate.89
LeRoy H. Redfern, S.Ed.
88 (Cal. 1947) 180 P. (2d) (Adv. Sheet) 21 at 25, (opinion withdrawn by
order of court), as modified on denial of rehearing, 181 P. (2d) 645 at 650.
87 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 264 (1935).
,
38 State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co. v. Cummer Lumber Co., 105 Fla. 522,
141 S. 602 (1932); Street & Co. v. Downs, 43 Ga. App. 688, 160 S.E. 97 (1931);
Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. v. Seward, 294 Mass. 349, 2 N.E. (2d)
448 (1936). Contra, McMillan v. Hendricks' Estate, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 153, 46
s.w. 859 (1898).
89 The only statute found that expressly relieves executors and administrators of
personal liability for torts of their agents and employees is a 1941 Act of the Michigan

